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Abstract: Since it has been shown that completeness and constructiveness
is an unattainable goal for paretian and anonymous social welfare relations on
infinite utility streams, recent contributions generally propose criteria display-
ing some incomparability. I suggest an interpretation of incomparability which
sets a limit to the recourse to the judgment of incomparability when certain
intergenerational choice axioms are to be satisfied. It leads to see as incom-
patible the axioms fixed step relative anonymity and stationarity. This conclu-
sion is obtained thanks to a generalization to infinite dimension of a lemma of
[d’Aspremont-Gevers 1977] on the equivalence between relative anonymity and
anonymity. It contrasts with [Asheim-d’Aspremont-Banerjee 2008] who build
a preorder satisfying both fixed step relative anonymity and stationarity. The
reason of this disagreement is that their result is obtained at the cost of ad-
ditional judgments of incomparability which are not justified according to the
interpretation of incomparability suggested here.
Keywords: Intergenerational choice; Comparability; Anonymity; Infinite
utility streams; Completeness.
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1 Introduction
Intergenerational choice models (or intertemporal choice models with infinite
horizon) have shown that tensions may exist between diﬀerent desirable proper-
ties. For example, it is diﬃcult to reconcile continuity, strong Pareto and finite
anonymity [Diamond 1965]. Tensions also exist between the properties of con-
sistency (transitivity, completeness, precision) of a preorder (i.e. a transitive and
reflexive binary relation, possibly incomplete) satisfying strong Pareto and finite
anonymity in the context of intergenerational choice. [Fleurbaey-Michel 2003]
provide an example where, when seeking to complete such a preorder, we can
lose in precision (i.e. some strict preferences are converted into indiﬀerence). If
we want to keep the same degree of precision, we can lose transitivity. Szpilrajn’s
theorem [Szpilrajn 1930] seemingly solves this dilemma between precision, com-
pleteness and transitivity. However, the problem of incalculability appears. This
problem means that, after having shown the existence of an order (i.e. a com-
plete preorder) having the desired properties, we cannot find a really applicable
method of implementation [Lauwers 2007], [Zame 2007].
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This is why some authors choose to weaken the requirement of complete-
ness, rather than weakening strong Pareto and finite anonymity. Among oth-
ers, [Basu-Mitra 2007] or [Asheim-d’Aspremont-Banerjee 2008]. To weaken the
requirement of completeness amounts adding the value “is incomparable with”
to the set of values a judgment can give. This set then becomes:
{"is better than", "is worse than", "is indiﬀerent to", "is incomparable with"}
It is however legitimate to ask about the practical meaning of the value “is
incomparable with”. If it is true that adding this value formally solves some
incompatibilities between axioms, what intuitive meaning could be given to it,
particularly in the context of social or intergenerational choice? This question is
important if it is considered that a social welfare relation does not only represent
a cold mechanism of aggregation of the preferences, but also expresses the tastes
of the “ethical observer”.
In the following, I suggest an interpretation of incomparability which leads
to the concept of forced judgment. Forced judgments set a limit to the recourse
to the judgment of incomparability when axioms consisting in equivalence re-
lations on the space of pairs of alternatives are to be satisfied. The concept is
applied to the axiom relative anonymity defined on the space of pairs of infi-
nite utility streams. It leads to see as incompatible the axioms fixed step relative
anonymity and stationarity. This result of incompatibility is obtained thanks to
a generalization to infinite dimension of a lemma of [d’Aspremont-Gevers 1977]
on the equivalence between relative anonymity and anonymity. It contrasts
with [Asheim-d’Aspremont-Banerjee 2008] who build a preorder satisfying both
fixed step relative anonymity and stationarity. But their preorder displays judg-
ments of incomparability which are not justified according to the interpretation
of incomparability suggested here.
Section 2 exposes the interpretation of incomparability and the resulting con-
cept of forced judgments. Section 3 introduces the notation. Section 4 explores
some general questions related to forced judgments. Section 5 presents a finite
case aiming at illustrating the concepts introduced in section 4: forced judg-
ments, forced preorder and primary judgments. Section 6 studies the relation
between the axioms relative anonymity and anonymity. It gives the general-
ization to infinite dimension of the lemma of [d’Aspremont-Gevers 1977] on the
equivalence between relative anonymity and anonymity. It is shown that, for
any order on infinite streams, relative anonymity with respect to any periodic
permutation is equivalent to anonymity with respect to that permutation (the-
orem 15). Periodic permutations are a set of permutations contained in the set
of cyclic permutations and containing the set of fixed step permutations. Cyclic
and fixed step permutations are well-known [Mitra-Basu 2007] or [Lauwers 2007]
whereas periodic permutations are introduced in the present paper. Moreover,
theorem 15 characterizes completely periodic permutations. So that this gener-
alization be accessible without necessarily passing by the definitions related to
forced judgments, results and proofs of subsection 6.2 are reformulated without
reference to these definitions (namely theorem 15, lemma 17 and corollary 18).
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Section 7 discusses the question of incompatibility between fixed step relative
anonymity and stationarity in the light of the concepts and results of previous
sections.
2 Incomparability and forced judgments
2.1 Practically, what does incomparability mean?
The intuitive interpretation of a judgment of incomparability (i.e. a judgment
taking the value "is incomparable with", section 3 gives formal definitions of
judgments and values) does not seem as direct and clear as that of the other
judgments. As an illustration, one never meets explicitly the choice “is incompa-
rable with” in vote procedures to choose political leaders. Although to abstain
from voting may be interpreted as a judgment of incomparability, some people
could also interpret abstention as a judgment of indiﬀerence. Actually, it is not
certain that people who are not accustomed to mathematical formalism could
distinguish between incomparability and indiﬀerence.
Because of that, one can be tempted to assimilate the judgment of incom-
parability with that of indiﬀerence, since the selection of an alternative among
two which are incomparable, is an arbitrary choice exactly as if the two alterna-
tives were indiﬀerent. But the problem is that the order obtained by replacing
incomparability with indiﬀerence is highly likely to be nontransitive.
One can also be tempted to prohibit such a value, which amounts requiring
completeness. But on the practical level, a preorder can be a tool of decision
as useful as an order, and easier to implement since it is authorized to remain
silent on certain pairs of alternatives. For example, if the two incomparable
alternatives are dominated by a third one, incomparability does not prevent
from selecting the optimal alternative, i.e. the third one. In this case, the exact
knowledge of the comparison between the first and the second alternative is not
of any help.
These remarks on incomparability are rather technical. It is also useful to
examine the significance of jugments compared to the final goal of the choice,
supposing that such a final goal exists, which should be the case if the consid-
ered choice problem is correctly defined. For example, the significance of the
judgment "the alternative x is better than the alternative y" is that x is more
appropriate than y to achieve the final goal of the choice. As for the judgment
of incomparability, it seems to me that the only case where the recourse to that
judgment may be legitimate, is when we do not know the impact of the substi-
tution of an alternative by the other on the final goal of the choice. In other
words, to judge that x is incomparable with y, in the context of a well-specified
choice problem with a clear final goal, is equivalent to not knowing which of the
values "is better than", "is worse than" or "is indiﬀerent to" to assign to the
pair (x, y).
But not to know the consequence of a choice does not mean that the conse-
quence does not exist. Consider the case of the political vote. If you don’t know
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which candidate will be better, this does not prevent that if elected, each candi-
date will take a succession of decisions which will allow you to reach some utility
level. If you could travel in time, you would see the utility level each candidate
would allow you to reach. You would return then to present and compare the
candidates in a precise way. The fact of not being able to travel in time and
not to know the ranking of the candidates, does not prevent that this ranking
exists objectively. It is just not known. It is as if, behind the preorder repre-
senting the known preferences, there is an underlying order able to compare all
the candidates and of which the considered preorder is a subrelation.
In short, the preorder representing the known preferences is the apparent
side of the underlying order representing the real preferences.
I am not trying to say that it is possible to prefer a thing to another without
being aware of this preference. Rather, I argue that if one does not know which
alternative is better, then, with more attention and information and with a thor-
ough analysis of the consequence of exchanging an alternative by the other on
the final goal of the choice, one should be able to know. If not, if it is absolutely
and definitively impossible to decide, even by devoting all the necessary eﬀort
and time, one should agree to declare the two alternatives indiﬀerent.
Note that this interpretation of incomparability as not knowing the underly-
ing judgment, is weaker than the well-known axiom 1 of [Arrow 1950] imposing
completeness. [Arrow 1950] justifies his axiom as follows (page 331):
...the chooser considers in turn all pairs of alternatives, say x and
y, and for each pair he makes one and only one of three decisions: x
is preferred to y, x is indiﬀerent to y, or y is preferred to x.
That the value “is incomparable with” does not appear in this enumeration
testifies to its not very intuitive nature.
Another possible interpretation of the judgment of incomparability is to give
to it a value in itself, autonomous with respect to the values "is better than",
"is worse than" or "is indiﬀerent to". This amounts to give the following answer
to the title of the section: "Incomparability means incomparability". But such
an interpretation seems to me purely formal. I tend to suppose that it would
make the mathematical modeling of preferences less intuitive. Consequently,
the model would deviate from the object to model. Therefore I stick, in this
paper, to the first interpretation.
2.2 If it can neither be worse nor similar, it is surely bet-
ter...
If you know the reason why you are making a choice, that is, if you have a clear
idea of the final goal of the choice, and if you know that in reference to that
final goal, a given alternative can neither be worse than nor similar to another
one, then you have good reasons to believe that it is better.
Let’s formalize that a little more. The interpretation of the judgment of
incomparability (as not knowing the consequences of the choice) does not invite
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to reject the concept of preorder, but rather to be interested in the family
of orders of which the considered preorder constitutes a subrelation. For a
preorder R on a set of alternatives E, let us denote < (R) this family of orders.
All the orders of < (R) agree on all judgments established by R, but some can
be in dissension on a pair of alternatives (x, y) when R considers (x, y) to be
incomparable. Moreover, if an axiom Π (or a set of axioms) is considered as
evident or ethically desirable, it is of interest to consider the subset < (R,Π) of
< (R), made up of the orders of < (R) satisfying Π.
Suppose that R considers (x, y) to be incomparable and that all the orders of
< (R,Π) establish the same judgment on a pair of alternatives (x, y), for instance
“x is better than y”. If one adheres to the suggested interpretation of the
judgment of incomparability and insists on satisfying Π, it becomes inevitable, I
believe, to grant some plausibility to the judgment “x is better than y”. Indeed,
on the one hand, the incomparability of (x, y) is understood as not knowing
which of the three values "is better than", "is worse than" or "is indiﬀerent to"
to assign to the pair (x, y), on the other hand judgments "x is worse than y" or
"x is indiﬀerent to y" would violate the axiom Π.
Notice that what is of interest here is not merely the preorder R, but the
preferences R is supposed to model. If satisfying the axiom Π implies that
we know that the only possible underlying judgment is "x is better than y",
then the position which consists in saying "We do not know which value to
assign to (x, y)" becomes diﬃcult to defend. At least, as long as the suggested
interpretation of incomparability is seen as acceptable, it should be recognized
that the judgement "x is incomparable with y" does not have the same strength
as if there was two orders in < (R,Π) giving two diﬀerent judgments on (x, y).
In the case where all the orders of < (R,Π) establish the same judgment
on (x, y), I suggest the terminology forced judgment under R and Π. Formal
definition is given further (section 4).
The terminology and the idea of forced judgment was inspired to me by
[d’Aspremont 2007] where it is question of forced adoption of a criterion for
a population of a given size when this criterion is adopted for populations of
lower sizes. A sequence of criteria applying to populations of increasing sizes
and checking this condition of forced adoption is said to be a proliferating se-
quence [d’Aspremont 2007]. In an obvious way, forced judgments on some pairs
of alternatives result from the forced adoption of a criterion. Here, I do not
investigate the forced judgments which could result from the increase in popu-
lation, as in [d’Aspremont 2007], but that which could result from the adoption
of certain axioms, considered as evident or ethically desirable and accompanying
the social preorder.
3 Notation
The (non empty) set of alternatives is denoted E. A preorder on E is a reflexive
and transitive binary relation. An order on E is a complete preorder.
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For a preorder R and two alternatives x and y, x %R y means "x is preferred
or indiﬀerent to y", x ÂR y means "x is preferred to y" and x ∼R y means "x
is indiﬀerent to y". The graph of a preorder R (which is a subset of E × E)
is G(R) = {(x, y) ∈ E ×E/x %R y}. A preorder expressing social choice may
be associated to one or more axioms which are considered evident or ethically
desirable. Axioms used in intergenerational choice theory can be preorders on
E. For example: Hammond equity axiom. In that case, the preorder expressing
intergenerational choice, say R, is required to admit the axiom as subrelation.
Axioms can also be equivalence relations on E. In that case, ∼Ris required
to admit the axiom as subrelation. For example: axioms of anonymity. Lastly,
axioms can also be equivalence relations on E×E. It is this case which concerns
us here. Let Π be an equivalence relation on E ×E. The preorder R is said to
satisfy Π if:
∀(x, y) and (x0, y0) in E ×E, [(x, y)Π(x0, y0)] =⇒ [x %R y =⇒ x0 %R y0] (1)
For example: the axiom relative anonymity ([d’Aspremont-Gevers 1977] or
[Asheim-d’Aspremont-Banerjee 2008]), or the axiom invariance with respect to
individual change of origin, denoted inv(ai+ui) in [d’Aspremont-Gevers 2002].
More details on relative anonymity and anonymity axioms will be provided
hereafter. Many other axioms of intergenerational choice are expressed in this
form of equivalence relation on E×E (see among others [d’Aspremont-Gevers 2002]).
We can associate to an equivalence relation Π on E × E, a correspondence
π in the following way:
π : E ×E → P (E ×E) (2)
(x, y) → {(x0, y0) ∈ E ×E/(x, y)Π(x0, y0)}
where P (E×E) is the set of subsets of E×E. For a subset A of E×E, denote
π (A) = ∪α∈Aπ (α). The relation between Π and π is bi-univocal. So, we can
refer indiﬀerently to the relation Π or the correspondence π.
The properties inherited by π are:
· reflexivity : ∀α ∈ E ×E, α ∈ π (α)
· symmetry: ∀α, β ∈ E ×E, β ∈ π (α) =⇒ α ∈ π (β)
· transitivity : ∀α ∈ E ×E, π (π (α)) ⊂ π (α)
Of course, transitivity and symmetry involve reflexivity.
The condition (1) writes π (G (R)) ⊂ G (R).
The following notations will also be convenient for the sequel: < (R) is the
set of orders of which the preorder R is a subrelation, i.e. for all S in < (R) and
for all x, y in E, x %R y implies x %S y and x ÂR y implies x ÂS y; < (R,Π)
(or < (R, π)) is the set of orders on E which satisfy Π (condition (1)) and admit
R as a subrelation; V is the set of values {Â,≺,∼}; a judgment is an element
of the set E ×E × V , for example (x, y,Â) means that the value Â is assigned
to the pair (x, y) ,i.e. x Â y; J (R) is the list of judgments established by the
preorder R, it is a subset of E ×E × V .
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For example, with these notations, x ÂR y is equivalent to (x, y,Â) ∈ J (R)
and S ∈ < (R) is equivalent to J (R) ⊂ J (S) .
I would request from the reader a little patience as for the introduction of
notations which may appear unusual such as judgments and correpondences2.
4 Some general considerations on forced judg-
ments
4.1 Definitions
Definition 1 A preorder R is said to be compatible with an axiom Π iﬀ
< (R,Π) is not empty.
Remark 2 R compatible with Π does not entail that condition (1) is checked.
However, theorem 6 shows that there exist a preorder, of which R is a subrela-
tion, checking condition (1). The issue of knowing to what extent condition (1)
implies that R is compatible with Π, is not tackled here.
Definition 3 Let x, y ∈ E . If (and only if) there exists v ∈ V = {≺,Â,∼}
such that, for all S in < (R,Π) , (x, y, v) ∈ J(S), then (x, y, v) is a forced
judgment on the pair (x, y) under the preorder R and the axiom Π. Moreover,
if (x, y, v) is a forced judgment on the pair (x, y) under the preorder R and the
axiom Π for every preorder R on E, then (x, y, v) is a forced judgment on the
pair (x, y) under the axiom Π.
Remark 4 It is equivalent to say that (x, y, v) is a forced judgment under the
axiom Π or to say that every order which satisfies Π establishes the judgment
(x, y, v). We will use sometimes the expression “forced indiﬀerence” which in-
dicates a forced judgment taking the value "is indiﬀerent to".
2Concerning judgments, it was necessary to define the forced preorder as being the list of
forced judgments. This requires to give a formal definition to the concept of forced judgment.
Therefore it was necessary as a preliminary to define what a judgment is.
Concerning correspondences of equivalence, the study of the compatibility between a pre-
order R on E and a relation of equivalence on E × E, amounts to see to what point one
can " project " a judgment established by R on a given pair of alternatives, on a subset of
E × E. This subset of E × E consists of the list of pairs of alternatives equivalent to the
initial pair. In this diagram, one mentally associates an element of E × E to a subset of
E × E. It is the concept of correspondence which expresses most naturally and directly this
mental association. For example, if this notation is avoided, it would be necessary each time
to replace the sentence "for all β in π (α)" by "for all (x0, y0) such that (x0, y0) is equivalent
to (x, y) according to Π". This would certainly encumber the text. Especially for the proof of
proposition 7, this notation seems inevitable. Notice that, to avoid confusion, one cannot use
the symbol ∼ for a relation of equivalence on E×E because it is already used for equivalence
on E.
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It is possible to weaken this definition by replacing the unanimity of the
orders of < (R,Π) by a more flexible decision rule. That requires to equip the
set < (R,Π) with an adapted structure. As first approach, I will stick here to
the rule of the unanimity.
4.2 Forced preorder
Suppose that R is compatible with Π. Denote F (R,Π) (or F (R, π)) the set of
forced judgments under R and Π. We may like to know if there exists a preorder
which list of judgments corresponds exactly to F (R,Π). If so, it would be the
preorder forced by R and Π. To know that, it is necessary to determine what
conditions have to be imposed on a subset of E × E × V so that this subset
corresponds to a preorder.
Lemma 5 Let J ⊂ E × E × V . J is the list of judgments of a preorder on E
iﬀ:
C1) Uniqueness: for any pair (x, y) of E×E, there exists at most one v ∈ V
such that (x, y, v) ∈ J.
C2) Symmetry between ≺ and Â: for any pair (x, y) of E×E, (x, y,≺) ∈ J
implies (y, x,Â) ∈ J.
C3) Symmetry of ∼: for any pair (x, y) of E × E, (x, y,∼) ∈ J implies
(y, x,∼) ∈ J.
C4) Reflexivity: for any x ∈ E, (x, x,∼) ∈ J.
C5) Transitivity: for any (x, y, z) of E×E×E, [(x, y,Â) ∈ J or (x, y,∼) ∈ J ]
and [(y, z,Â) ∈ J or (y, z,∼) ∈ J ]implies [(x, z,Â) ∈ J or (x, z,∼) ∈ J ] .
Proof. If R is a preorder on E, then J(R) obviously satisfies conditions C1 to
C5. Conversely, denote RJ the binary relation on E defined by: x %RJ y iﬀ11
[(x, y,Â) ∈ J or (x, y,∼) ∈ J ]. From conditions C4 and C5, RJ is reflexive and
transitive. We must check that the list of judgments of RJ is J , i.e. J(RJ) = J .
That is, we must check the following equivalences for all x, y in E:
x %RJ y and y %RJ x⇔ (x, y,∼) ∈ J (3)
x %RJ y and non y %RJ x⇔ (x, y,Â) ∈ J (4)
x -RJ y and non y -RJ x⇔ (x, y,≺) ∈ J (5)
(3) According to the definition of x %RJ y, it is easily seen that (x, y,∼) ∈ J
implies x %RJ y and y %RJ x. Conversely, having x %RJ y and y %RJ x amounts
to having [(x, y,Â) ∈ J or (x, y,∼) ∈ J ] and [(y, x,Â) ∈ J or (y, x,∼) ∈ J ]. It
is not possible to have (x, y,Â) ∈ J and (y, x,Â) ∈ J , if not, by transitivity, it
would yield (x, x,Â) ∈ J , what contradicts conditions C4 and C1. It is neither
possible to have (x, y,Â) ∈ J and (y, x,∼) ∈ J . By condition C3, we would
have (x, y,∼) ∈ J . Together with (x, y,Â) ∈ J , this contradicts conditions
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C1. Likewise for (y, x,Â) ∈ J and (x, y,∼) ∈ J. Thus, we have necessarily
(x, y,∼) ∈ J and (y, x,∼) ∈ J.
(4) According to the definition of x %RJ y, we see that (x, y,Â) ∈ J implies
x %RJ y . It also implies, by condition C1, that we have neither (x, y,≺) ∈ J
nor (x, y,∼) ∈ J . So, by conditions C2 and C3, we have neither (y, x,Â) ∈ J
nor (y, x,∼) ∈ J . Thus we have not y %RJ x.
(5) Same proof as (4)
Theorem 6 If the preorder R is compatible with Π, then there exists a unique
preorder FR,Π which list of judgments corresponds exactly to the set of forced
judgments under R and Π . Moreover, FR,Π satisfies Π in the sense of condition
(1).
Proof. Thanks to lemma 5, it is enough now to prove that F (R,Π) checks
conditions 1 to 5. Suppose there exist x, y in E and v1, v2 in V such that
(x, y, v1) ∈ F (R,Π) and (x, y, v2) ∈ F (R,Π).For all S in < (R,Π) , (x, y, v1) ∈
J(S) and (x, y, v2) ∈ J(S). But a given S have exactly one judgment on a given
pair (x, y) . Hence v1 = v2.Thus, condition 1 is checked. In the same manner,
conditions 2, 3, 4 and 5 are easily checked.
Now let (x, y) and (x0, y0) be two pairs of alternatives such that (x, y)Π(x0, y0)
and x %FR,Π y. For all S in < (R,Π), FR,Π being a subrelation to S, we have
x %S y. Together with (x, y)Π(x0, y0), and since S satisfies Π, we deduce x0 %S
y0. Thus x0 % y0 is a forced judgment, i.e. x0 %FR,Π y0. This shows that the
preorder FR,Π satisfies Π.
Notice that FR,Π is not in general complete, as the example in section 5.
4.3 Primary judgments: a draft
It can be interesting to study the relation between on the one hand R and Π,
on the other hand FR,Π. More precisely, it is of interest to know to what extent
it is possible to reduce R to a subrelation R0 without changing the preorder
FR,Π, i.e. with FR,Π = FR0,Π? This "minimization problem" would lead to
decompose the set of forced judgments under R and Π into two components: on
the one hand the judgments of a minimal relation R0, that could be interpreted
as primary judgments of R, freed from the influence of Π; on the other hand the
judgments obtained from primary judgments by application of Π. An example
of a set of primary judgments is provided in section 5.
As first step, it would be of interest to answer to another question. Let
r be a set of representatives of the equivalence classes of Π. In the sequel, r
is called a reduction of Π. Using the correspondence π instead of Π (for the
definition of π,see (2), page 6), a reduction r of π is a subset of E×E, maximal
for inclusion, for which there does not exist α and β in r checking α 6= β and
β ∈ π (α). Suppose that R and Π check condition (1). If we know the set
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r ∩ G (R), we can deduce the remaining forced judgments under R and π.The
question is: can we reduce the "size" of the set r ∩ G (R) by choosing another
reduction of π? Formally: does it exist a reduction r0 such that r0 ∩ G (R) is
strictly included in r ∩G (R)?
Proposition 7 answers this question negatively, what suggests that changing
the reduction cannot contribute to the determination of primary judgments.
The proof of proposition 7 is based on a partitioning of G(R) in two parts,
one part being r ∩ G (R) and the other part the image of the former by the
correspondence eπ = π− Identity (see figure 1). It follows that reducing the set
r ∩ G (R) to a smaller reduction, say r0 ∩ G (R), would also reduce its image.
Thus, we would not obtain a new partition of G (R) , what would have been the
case if r0 was a reduction of π. A contradiction.
Proposition 7 If R and Π check condition (1), for any reduction r of π, r ∩
G (R) is maximal. I.e. there does not exist another reduction r0 such as r0∩G (R)
strictly contains r ∩G (R).
Proof. Let r be a reduction of π. Denote eπ the correspondence from E ×E to
P (E × E) defined by ∀α ∈ E × E, eπ (α) = π (α) − {α}. Let’s show first that
r ∩G (R0) and eπ (r ∩G (R0)) make a partition of G (R0) (see figure 1).
We check easily that r and eπ (r) make a partition of E ×E. Thus r ∩G (R)
and eπ (r) ∩ G (R) make a partition of G (R) . Let’s show that eπ (r ∩G (R)) =eπ (r)∩G (R). By definition, eπ (r ∩G (R)) = ∪α∈r∩G(R)eπ (α). Thus β ∈ eπ (r ∩G (R))
means that there exists α in r ∩ G (R) such that β ∈ eπ (α). As a result
β ∈ eπ (r) and β ∈ eπ (G (R)). Thus β ∈ eπ (r) ∩ G (R). Conversely, let β ∈eπ (r)∩G (R) .Thus there is α ∈ r such that β ∈ eπ (α). π being symmetrical, we
deduce that α ∈ eπ (β). Since β ∈ G(R), we have α ∈ eπ (G(R)). Since condition
(1) on R and π implies eπ (G(R)) ⊂ G(R), we have α ∈ G(R). Thus we have
α ∈ r ∩G(R) and since β ∈ eπ (α), β ∈ eπ (r ∩G(R)).
Let’s suppose now that there exist two reductions r1 and r2 such that r2 ∩
G(R) strictly contains r1 ∩ G(R). There would exist α in r2 ∩ G(R) and not
in r1 ∩G(R). Since r1 ∩G (R) and eπ (r1 ∩G (R)) make a partition of G (R), α
should be in eπ (r1 ∩G (R)). But r1∩G(R) ⊂ r2∩G(R) implies eπ (r1 ∩G(R)) ⊂eπ (r2 ∩G(R)). Consequently α should also be in eπ (r2 ∩G(R)), what would be
contradictory with α ∈ r2 ∩ G(R), since r2 ∩ G (R) and eπ (r2 ∩G (R)) make a
partition of G (R).
Remark 8 Proposition 7 requires condition (1) on R and Π. If R and Π only
check the following weaker condition
∀(x, y) and (x0, y0) in E ×E, [(x, y)Π(x0, y0)] =⇒ [x %R y =⇒ non(x0 ≺R y0)]
(6)
one could apply proposition 7 to the preorder R0 defined by: x %R0 y iﬀ there
is (x0, y0) in π (x, y) such that x0 %R y0. Indeed, R0 and Π obviously check
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Figure 1: Partition of G(R) according to eπ
condition (1) and primary judgments are the same for R and R0. It is easily
seen that condition (6) is weaker than the condition "R and Π are compatible".
4.4 Is there forced judgments without imposing an axiom
?
Section 6 deals with a situation where, even if the graph of the preorder is empty
, i.e. no preorder is imposed, the correspondence induces forced judgments.
On the contrary, the following proposition, which is a corollary of Szpilrajn’s
theorem, shows that a preorder alone never presents forced judgments apart
from its own judgments.
Proposition 9 should be useful for the determination of forced preorders.
Indeed, by ensuring the existence of orders having diﬀerent judgments on a pair
of alternatives, say (x, y), one proves that x and y are incomparable with respect
to the forced preorder considered.
11
Proposition 9 If R is a preorder on a set E, and if there exists x ∈ E and
y ∈ E such hat x and y are incomparable according to R, then there exist three
orders R1, R2 and R3 of which R is a subrelation, such that x ÂR1 y , x ≺R2 y
and x ∼R3 y.
Proof. 1- Existence of R1and R2 : It is enough to prove the existence of R1.
The existence of R2 would result by symmetry.
Let’s consider the relation R0 defined by
u ∼ R0v ⇐⇒ u ∼R v
u Â R0v ⇐⇒ [u ÂR v or (u %R x and y %R v)]
The proof showing that R0 is a preorder which completes R can be found
(with the help of some minor adjustments) in the proof of Szpilrajn’s theo-
rem ([Szpilrajn 1930], lemma 1). Moreover, we have x ÂR0 y. According to
Szpilrajn’s theorem, there exists an order R1 completing R0. Consequently, R1
completes R and checks x ÂR1 y.
2- Existence of R3 : Let’s consider the relation R”defined by
u %R” v ⇐⇒ [u %R v or [(u %R x or u %R y) and (x %R v or y %R v)]]
First let’s check that R” completes R. If v ÂR u, the condition
[(u %R x or u %R y) and (x %R v or y %R v)]
would imply
[v ÂR u and (u %R x or u %R y)]
But, by transitivity of R, (v ÂR u and u %R x) would yield v ÂR x and
(v ÂR u and u %R x) would yield v ÂR y. Suppose v ÂR x. Let’s consider
the condition (x %R v or y %R v) . With v ÂR x, it would yield (by transitiv-
ity) y %R v. We would then have y %R v ÂR x, thus y ÂR x. This would
contradict the assumption of incomparability between x and y. Thus, the con-
dition (x %R v or y %R v) cannot be true. Symmetrically, if we suppose v ÂR y
, we would end in the same way to non (x %R v or y %R v). Consequently, the
condition
[(u %R x or u %R y) and (x %R v or y %R v)]
is not consistent with v ÂR u. This shows that R” completes R.
The reflexivity of R” results from the reflexivity of R. For the transitivity,
let u, v and w be such that u %R” v and v %R” w. The 4 following cases must
be considered:
a) u %R v and v %R w : In this case, u %R w thus u %R” w.
b) u %R v and [(v %R x or v %R y) and (x %R w or y %R w)] : This
implies, by transitivity of R, (u %R x or u %R y), thus
[(u %R x or u %R y) and (x %R w or y %R w)]
thus u %R” w.
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c) [(u %R x or u %R y) and (x %R v or y %R v)] and v %R w : This im-
plies, by transitivity of R, (x %R w or y %R w), thus
[(u %R x or u %R y) and (x %R w or y %R w)]
thus u %R” w.
d)
[(u %R x or u %R y) and (x %R v or y %R v)]
and
[(v %R x or v %R y) and (x %R w or y %R w)]
This directly yields
[(u %R x or u %R y) and (x %R w or y %R w)]
thus u %R” w.
Same manner as for R1 and R2, it is enough to complete R” by an order R3.
5 A finite case
5.1 The axiom and the preorder
Consider the following set of alternatives
E = {A;B;C;TA;TB}
where TA and TB are respectively alternatives obtained by applying a trans-
formation T to the two alternatives A and B. For example, this model can
represent the choice among the seaside resorts A= Hammamet, B= Soussa and
C= Kerkena. T is the transformation “70 km towards the south”. Thus, TA
indicates Akouda, TB indicates Mahdia. It is that TTA = B, since Soussa is
located 140 km south of Hammamet. There is no seaside resorts 70 km south
of Mahdia. Neither is there seaside resorts 70 km north and south of Kerkena
(which is an island). Hence, TB has not an image by T and C has neither an
image nor an antecedent by T.
Consider the correspondence bπ defined on E ×E by
bπ (x, y) = ½ (x0, y0) ∈ E ×E/ (x0, y0) = (Tx, Ty) or
(x, y) = (Tx0, Ty0) or (x, y) = (x0, y0)
¾
bπ is reflexive and symmetric, but not transitive. Let π be the transitive
closure of bπ,i.e.:
π (x, y) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
(x0, y0) ∈ E ×E/∃ a sequence (x1, y1) ... (xn, yn)
such that (x1, y1) = (x, y) , (xn, yn) = (x0, y0)
and (xi, yi) ∈ bπ (xi−1, yi−1) , i = 2, ...n
⎫
⎬
⎭
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Let’s calculate the correspondence π for any couple of E × E. Notice that
(x0, y0) ∈ π (x, y)⇐⇒ (y0, x0) ∈ π (y, x), so that following calculations determine
π completely:
π (A,B) = {(A,B) ; (TA, TB)}
π (A, TB) = {(A, TB)}
π (A, TA) = {(A, TA) ; (TA,B) ; (B, TB)}
π (A,A) = {(A,A) ; (TA, TA) ; (B,B) ; (TB, TB)}
π (A,C) = {(A,C)}
π (B,C) = {(B,C)}
π (TA,C) = {(TA,C)}
π (TB,C) = {(TB,C)}
π (C,C) = {(C,C)}
We can see that a reduction (i.e. a set of representatives of the equivalence
classes of π, see 3.c) of π is
r = r1 ∪ r2 ∪ r3
where
r1 = {(A,B) ; (A, TB) ; (A, TA) ; (A,C) ; (B,C) ; (TA,C) ; (TB,C)}
r2 = {(B,A) ; (TB,A) ; (TA,A) ; (C,A) ; (C,B) ; (C, TA) ; (C, TB)}
r3 = {(A,A) ; (C,C)}
Suppose that it is considered desirable that π is satisfied, what amounts
saying that if one prefers x to y, one must also prefer Tx to Ty.
Consider the following preorder R defined by his graph .
G(R) = {(A,A) ; (B,B) ; (TB, TB) ; (TA, TA) ; (C,C) ; (A,TA) ; (TA,B) ; (C, TA)}
We exhibit the forced judgments under R and π, the sets < (R, π) and
F (R,Π), the preorder FR,Π and the primary judgments.
5.2 Forced judgments
Observe that R does not satisfy π since, for example, (B, TB) ∈ π (A, TA)
though the judgments of R on (B, TB) and (A, TA) are not similar.
Any order S in < (R, π) judges necessarily : A Â TA, TA Â B and B Â TB.
Indeed, (A, TA,Â) ∈ J(R) implies (A, TA,Â) ∈ J(S). Since S satisfies π,
for all (x, y) ∈ π (A, TA) we have (x, y,Â) ∈ J(S). Consequently, (A, TA,Â) ,
(TA,B,Â) and (B, TB,Â) are in F (R, π). These judgments can be written
A Â TA Â B Â TB
Consequently, the transitive and reflexive closure of the set of judgments
A Â TA Â B Â TB is a subrelation to every order S in < (R, π). Obviously,
< (R, π) is not empty. For example, the transitive and reflexive closure of the
set of judgments C Â A Â TA Â B Â TB is an element of < (R,π) .Thus R and
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π are compatible. According to theorem 6, the set F (R, π) defines a preorder
FR,π that satisfies π. Hence, the transitive and reflexive closure of the set of
judgments A Â TA Â B Â TB is a subrelation to FR,π. It is easily checked that
it corresponds in fact exactly to FR,π. < (R, π) is then the set of orders on E
admitting FR,π as subrelation and satisfying π.
As it can be seen, FR,π is not complete. It judges C incomparable with
the other alternatives. Hence, arguing for the interpretation of incomparability
suggested in the introduction does not involve requiring completeness. However,
FR,π displays less incomparability than R. For instance, FR,π judges A Â B
whereas A and B are incomparable according to R. Observe that if C is removed
from E, all pairs of alternatives would become comparable according to FR,π.
Thus, FR,π would become an order and < (R, π) = {FR,π} . In this case, there
would be no more room for incomparability.
5.3 Primary judgments
We have r∩G(R) = {(A,A) ; (C,C) ; (A, TA) ; (C, TA)}. Consider the extension
of R by the preorder R0 as in remark 8. It can be checked that it is not possible
to decrease the set r ∩ G(R0) by choosing another reduction. Proposition 7
shows that this holds in the general case. Primary judgments are to be sought
among judgments (A, TA,Â),(TA,A,≺), (C, TA,Â) , (TA,C,≺) , (A,A,∼) and
(C,C,∼), since the other forced judgments under R and π can be obtained by
applying π. In fact we can check that these judgments form a set of primary
judgments. That is, if we remove one of them, the set of forced judgments
under the relation thus defined and π, would be diﬀerent from the set of forced
judgments under R and π.
6 The relative anonymity axiom
6.1 The finite dimension case
I seek to study the forced judgments emanating from the axiom relative anonymity
(see definition further) in the context of intergenerational choice. The conse-
quences of this axiom were studied in [d’Aspremont-Gevers 1977] in the context
of a social welfare functional and with a finite number of individuals. The
authors established (lemma 4) the implication relative anonymity3 =⇒ finite
anonymity.
First, I present the assumptions of the lemma followed by the lemma. Then,
within the framework of formal welfarism, which is a usual assumption in inter-
generational choice theory, I give the translation of the lemma in term of social
order instead of social welfare functional. In the next subsection, I extend the
3This property is called anonymity in [d’Aspremont-Gevers 1977].
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lemma to infinite populations. That will be used to highlight forced judgments
induced by relative anonymity in the case of infinite population.
In [d’Aspremont-Gevers 1977], the set E of the alternatives is unspecified.
The population is composed of n individuals. U is the set of bounded functions
from E to Rn (R denotes the real line) and f a social welfare functional which
associates to each u ∈ U an order on E denoted Ru. u (x)i is the nth component
of u (x). f may satisfy the following properties. Recall that x %R y means "x
is preferred or indiﬀerent to y according to a relation R".
independence of irrelevant alternatives : For all u1, u2 in U , and x, y in
E
[u1 (x) = u2 (x) and u1 (y) = u2 (y)]
=⇒ Ru1 and Ru2 have the same judgment on (x, y)
strong Pareto: ∀x, y in E, ∀u in U, x %Ru y if ∀i in {1, .., n}, u (x)i ≥
u (y)i. If moreover ∃j in {1, .., n} such that u (x)j > u (y)j , then x ÂRu y.
relative anonymity: For all permutation σ on {1, .., n}, if u1 and u2 in
U are such that ∀i in {1, .., n} and ∀x in E we have u1 (x)i = u2 (x)σ(i), then
Ru1 = Ru2 .
Proposition 10 ([d’Aspremont-Gevers 1977], lemma 4): If f satisfies to inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives, strong Pareto and relative anonymity, then
∀u in U , ∀x, y in E, if x and y are such that there exists a permutation σ on
{1, .., n} such that ∀i in {1, .., n} we have u (x)i = u (y)σ(i) , then x ∼Ru y.
The assumptions independence of irrelevant alternatives and strong Pareto
are only used to guarantee what of [d’Aspremont-Gevers 2002] call formal wel-
farism. That means that "the goodness of a state of aﬀairs can be judged entirely
by the goodness of the utilities in that state", according to [Sen 1980] quoted by
[d’Aspremont-Gevers 2002]. In the context of this section, we are from the start
within the framework of formal welfarism. This makes it possible to regard
utility streams as alternatives. E, the set of alternatives, becomes Rn. The
properties strong Pareto and relative anonymity of the social welfare functional
are inherited by the image-order R on Rn as it will be specified. The assump-
tion independence of irrelevant alternatives is automatically checked. Here is
the translation of the properties and the lemma in this context4.
strong Pareto: ∀x, y in Rn, x %R y if ∀i in {1, .., n}, xi ≥ yi. if moreover
∃j in {1, .., n} such that xj > yj , then x ÂR y.
relative anonymity: For all permutation σ on {1, .., n}, ∀i in {1, .., n}
and ∀x, y in Rn we have x %R y =⇒ σ (x) %R σ (y), where σ (x) is obtained by
permuting the components of x according to σ.
The lemma’s translation is:
4To arrive at this translation starting from R, it is enough to consider the social welfare
functional which associates to a bounded function from Rn to Rn, denoted u, the order Ru
defined by x %Ru y iﬀ u (x) %R u (y).
16
Proposition 11 If R is an order on Rn satisfying strong Pareto and relative
anonymity, for all permutation σ on {1, .., n} and ∀x in Rn we have x ∼R σ (x) .
Condition "∀x in Rn : x ∼R σ (x) ” is called the anonymity condition. If
x has an infinity of components and if σ permutes only a finite number of
components, the condition takes the name of finite anonymity.
6.2 The infinite dimension case
I now seek to extend proposition 11 to a set of alternatives made up of all infinite
real sequences, or streams. This is carried out by theorem 15.
In order to facilitate the reading for those who are not interested in the
concept of forced judgments, statements having recourse to this concept (namely
theorem 15, lemma 17 and corollary 18) will be followed of a translation free
from this concept.
Before stating theorem 15, it is necessary to give definition 12, definition 13
and proposition 14 which connects these definitions.
Denote the set of all infinite real sequences RN∗ , where N∗ is the set of
positive integers. Denote σ a permutation on N∗. In what follows permutations
are on N∗. To reduce the notations, write σ (k) for the image of an integer k by
σ and also σ (x) for the vector of RN∗ obtained by permuting the components
of x according to σ.
Definition 12 Periodic permutation: A permutation σ is periodic iﬀ there ex-
ists an integer n ≥ 1 such that σn = identity.
Definition 13 Fixed step permutation: A permutation σ on N∗ is said to be
fixed step iﬀ there exists a partition of N∗: N1, N2...such that ∀i, j, |Ni| = |Nj |
and σ can be written as a composition of permutations σ1 ◦ σ2 ◦ ...where for all
i and j such that j 6= i, σi leaves invariant all the elements of Nj .
Definition 12 is more demanding than the condition of cyclicity met in the
literature ([Mitra-Basu 2007] or [Lauwers 2007]). In other words, any periodic
permutation is cyclic, but not the converse. Definition 13 results directly from
the definitions found, among others, in [Asheim-d’Aspremont-Banerjee 2008].
All the σi are in fact finite permutations on {1, .., p} where p = |Ni|.
Proposition 14 Every fixed step permutation σ is periodic.
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Proof. For all finite permutation σi on {1, .., p} and for all k in {1, .., p}, there
exists an integer pi such that σ
pi
i (k) = k. Moreover, it is necessary to have
pi ≤ p, otherwise σni (k) would go out of {1, .., p} for some n. It is deduced
that σp!i = identity, ∀σi. Since composition between σi and σj is commutative
because they operate on disjoint subsets of N∗, we have
σp! = (σ1 ◦ σ2 ◦ ...)p!
= σp!1 ◦ σ
p!
2 ◦ ... = identity
The set of fixed step permutations, equipped with composition, is a group
([Mitra-Basu 2007], [Lauwers 2007]). But the set of periodic permutations is not
a group. For example let us consider the following permutations
π1 : (1, 2) (3, 4) ... (2p− 1, 2p) ...
and
π2 : (1) (2, 3) (4, 5) ... (2p, 2p+ 1) ...
π1 and π2 are periodic. But π3 = π1 ◦π2 is not (see [Lauwers 2007] for more
details on π1, π2 and π3).
Denote P (RN∗) the set of subsets of RN∗ and P (RN∗×RN∗) the set of subsets
of RN∗ ×RN∗ .
Let’s consider now the correspondence πfsra :
RN
∗ ×RN∗ → P
³
RN
∗ ×RN∗
´
(7)
(x, y) → {(x0, y0) /∃σ fixed step permutation, x0 = σ (x) and y0 = σ (y)}
πfsra is an equivalence correspondence because the set of fixed step permu-
tations, equipped with composition, is a group.
Let σ be a permutation. Denote πσ the correspondence
RN
∗ ×RN∗ → P
³
RN
∗ ×RN∗
´
(x, y) → {(x0, y0) /∃n ∈ Z, x0 = σn (x) and y0 = σn (y)}
where Z is the set of integers
Not to weigh down the notations, denote also πσ the correspondence:
RN
∗ → P
³
RN
∗
´
x → {x0/∃n ∈ Z, x0 = σn (x)}
We can check that it is an equivalence correspondence.
We are now ready to state the generalization of proposition 11:
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Theorem 15 σ is periodic iﬀ for all x in RN∗, the judgment on (x, σ (x)) is
forced indiﬀerence under πσ.
Theorem 15 without forced judgments: σ is periodic iﬀ for all x in RN∗and
for all orders on RN∗ satisfying πσ, x is indiﬀerent to σ (x).
Theorem 15 oﬀers to some extent a characterization of periodic permuta-
tions. To establish theorem 15, I show initially that a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for a permutation σ to be periodic, is that the sequence of successive
images of any x in RN∗ has only a finite number of terms (lemma 16). Then I
show that this last condition is also necessary and suﬃcient so that the judg-
ment between any element of RN∗ and its image by σ is forced indiﬀerence under
πσ (lemma 17).
Lemma 16 A permutation σ is periodic iﬀ ∀x ∈ RN∗ , the sequence
x, σ (x) , σ2 (x) , σ3 (x) ..., σn (x) ...
takes a finite number of values.
Proof. Suﬃciency is evident. Let’s suppose that σ is not periodic and show
that the condition
∀x, the sequence x, σ (x) , σ2 (x) , σ3 (x) ..., σn (x) ...is finite
does not hold.
σ non periodic writes : ∀n ≥ 1, ∃k ∈ N∗ such that σn(k) 6= k. Denote one of
these k, k (n). Take x = (1, 2, 3, 4...). Let i and j be two nonnegative integers
such that i > j. We have σi (x) = σi−j(σj (x)). Denote i − j = n. For all y
in RN∗ , the k (n)th component of y does not return in its place in σn (y) since
σn(k (n)) 6= k (n). Take y = σj (x). As all the components of y are pairwise
diﬀerent, we have necessarily σn(y) 6= y. Thus σi (x) 6= σj(x).The sequence
x, σ (x) , σ2 (x) , σ3 (x) ..., σn (x) ...is thus infinite.
Lemma 17 Let x ∈ RN∗ and σ be a permutation. Then, the judgment on
(x, σ (x)) is forced indiﬀerence under πσ iﬀ the sequence
x, σ (x) , σ2 (x) , σ3 (x) ..., σn (x) ...
takes a finite number of values.
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Lemma 17 without forced judgments: Let x ∈ RN∗ and σ be a permutation.
Then, x is indiﬀerent to σ (x) for any order R on RN∗which satisfies πσ, iﬀ the
sequence
x, σ (x) , σ2 (x) , σ3 (x) ..., σn (x) ...
takes a finite number of values.
Proof. If the sequence takes a finite number of values, there exist two diﬀerent
nonnegative integers n,m such that σn(x) = σm(x). Let us suppose n > m.
Let R be an order which satisfies πσ. Let j be the judgment of R on (x, σ (x)).
j is equal either to Â or ≺ or ∼. Since R satisfies πσ, R will have the same
judgment on
¡
σ (x) , σ2 (x)
¢
and on¡
σ2 (x) , σ3 (x)
¢
...
¡
σm(x), σm+1(x)
¢
...
¡
σn−1(x), σn(x)
¢
=
¡
σn−1(x), σm(x)
¢
The transitivity of R imposes that this judgment can only be indiﬀerence.
Conversely, Suppose that the terms of the sequence
x, σ (x) , σ2 (x) , σ3 (x) ..., σn (x) ...
are pairwise diﬀerent. Denote
X =
©
x, σ (x) , σ2 (x) , σ3 (x) ..., σn (x) ...
ª
and
πσ (X) = ∪y∈Xπσ (y)
Notice first that, because of the transitivity of πσ, πσ (X) and πσ (X) (the
complementary of πσ (X) in RN
∗
) are stable by πσ. Moreover, for each z in
πσ (X), there exists a unique i in Z such that z = σi (x). Denote i (z) that
integer.
Then, define the following order R1:
· For (y, z) in πσ (X)× πσ (X), y %R1 z iﬀ i (y) ≤ i (z).
· For (y, z) in πσ (X)× πσ (X), y ÂR1 z .
· For (y, z) in πσ (X)× πσ (X), y ∼R1 z .
We see that R1 is complete, reflexive, transitive and that it satisfies πσ.
Moreover, we have x ÂR1 σ (x). Symmetrically, build R2 in such a way that it
coincide with R1 on πσ (X) × πσ (X) and πσ (X) × πσ (X) with, for all (y, z)
in πσ (X) × πσ (X), y %R2 z iﬀ i (z) ≤ i (y). We see that R2 establishes the
judgment: x ≺R2 σ (x). Since there are two possible diﬀerent judgments on
(x, σ (x)) by orders which satisfy πσ, there is no forced judgment on (x, σ (x))
under πσ.
Proof. (of theorem 15): It suﬃces to join lemma 16 and lemma 17.
Since any fixed step permutation is periodic (proposition 14), we deduce
from theorem 15:
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Corollary 18 Under πfsra (for the definition of πfsra, see (7), page 18), for
all x in RN∗ and σ fixed step permutation, the judgment on (x, σ (x)) is forced
indiﬀerence.
Corollary 18 without forced judgments: For any order on RN∗ satisfying πfsra
, any x in RN∗ and any fixed step permutation σ, x is indiﬀerent to σ (x).
A preorder R which satisfies πfsra is said to be fixed step relatively anony-
mous. The indiﬀerence between x and a fixed step permuted of x is known as
fixed step anonymity.
Corollary 18 generalizes proposition 11 on the one hand by extending it
to infinite dimension, on the other hand by not requiring the condition strong
Pareto. Also let’s notice that it requires the preorder to satisfy only fixed step
relative anonymity, weaker than strong relative anonymity (which means satis-
fying πσ for any permutation σ). It oﬀers the property of fixed step anonymity,
stronger than finite anonymity. In the finite setting, there is no diﬀerence be-
tween fixed step relative anonymity and strong relative anonymity nor between
fixed step anonymity and finite anonymity.
7 The incompatibility between fixed step rela-
tive anonymity and stationarity
In this section, we need to use the axioms finite Pareto and stationarity. Finite
Pareto is weaker than strong Pareto. It states that if there is a finite num-
ber of generations that are better oﬀ in x compared to y, and if the remaining
generations have the same situations in both streams, then x should be pre-
ferred to y. Stationarity stipulates that adding the same first component to
two streams should not change the judgment on these two streams. I refer to
[Asheim-d’Aspremont-Banerjee 2008] for formal definitions of these two axioms
(section 2.3).
In [Asheim-d’Aspremont-Banerjee 2008], it is noticed that the axioms fixed
step anonymity, finite Pareto and stationarity are incompatible. For example,
both following streams are indiﬀerent under the terms of fixed step anonymity :
x = 1 0 1 0 1 ..
y = 0 1 0 1 0 ..
According to stationarity and starting from the previous example, one can
deduce that both following streams should be also indiﬀerent:
y = 0 1 0 1 0 ..
z = 0 0 1 0 1 ..
But, according to finite Pareto,
x = 1 0 1 0 1 ..
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strictly dominate
z = 0 0 1 0 1 ..
Consequently, in the present circumstance, the judgment established by fixed
step anonymity and stationarity is inconsistent with the judgment established
by finite Pareto. Since finite Pareto is generally seen as the most uncontroversial
among these three axioms, the example demonstrates the incompatibility of fixed
step anonymity and stationarity.
Moreover, [Asheim-d’Aspremont-Banerjee 2008] show that it is possible to
build a preorder they call the generalized time-invariant overtaking so that it
checks Finite Pareto, stationarity and fixed step relative anonymity
([Asheim-d’Aspremont-Banerjee 2008], definition 2 and theorem 1). Hence,
loosing fixed step anonymity to the weaker axiom fixed step relative anonymity
may appear as a mean to solve the incompatibility between fixed step anonymity
and stationarity.
However, the cost of satisfying simultaneously fixed step anonymity and sta-
tionarity is additional incomparability, compared with more traditional pre-
orders such as the catching up or the fixed-step catching up (definitions in
[Asheim-d’Aspremont-Banerjee 2008], section 4). For example, the general-
ized time-invariant overtaking declares the streams x and y to be incomparable
whereas for the catching up x is better than y and for the fixed-step catching up
x and y are indiﬀerent.
If we stick to the interpretation of incomparability suggested in the intro-
duction, such a judgment of incomparability is not possible while claiming to
satisfy fixed step relative anonymity. Indeed, corollary 18 aﬃrms that there
is not a real diﬀerence between fixed step relative anonymity and fixed step
anonymity. In other words, to aﬃrm that the preferences satisfy fixed step rela-
tive anonymity amounts to aﬃrm that they satisfy fixed step anonymity. Recall
that the suggested interpretation of incomparability implies that the preferences
are represented by the forced preorder, not merely by the preorder we chose to
start with. One might restate that in the form of an axiom of comparability:
Axiom of comparability: If the preferences are to satisfy a preorder R
and an axiom Π, then they satisfy FR,Π.
Under this axiom, it cannot exist preferences satisfying finite Pareto and
satisfying at the same time fixed step relative anonymity and stationarity. It is
thus necessary to choose one of these two axioms.
If we choose fixed step relative anonymity, preferences are then represented
by FR,fixed step relative anonymity . Assume that the preorder R and fixed step
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relative anonymity are compatible5 , that is,
< (R,fixed step relative anonymity) 6= ∅
and that R checks finite Pareto.
We then have
x ∼FR,fixed step relative anonymity y (8)
Finite Pareto implies
x ÂR z
thus, we also have
x ÂFR,fixed step relative anonymity z (9)
(8) and (9) imply
y ÂFR,fixed step relative anonymity z (10)
(8) and (10) imply that FR,fixed step relative anonymity does not check station-
arity.
Now let’s choose stationarity. Assume that the preorder R and stationarity
are compatible and that R checks finite Pareto. The previous example with
FR,fixed step relative anonymity shows that there cannot be indiﬀerence between x
and y.
Suppose we had
y ÂFR,stationarity x
By stationarity, this would give
z ÂFR,stationarity y
Thus, by transitivity
z ÂFR,stationarity x
what would violate finite Pareto. Therefore, x could only be either better than
or incomparable with y with respect to FR,stationarity . But saying this amounts
to say that "x is better than y” is a forced judgment under R and stationarity.
Consequently, we have necessarily
x ÂFR,stationarity y (11)
Thus, FR,stationarity does not check fixed step relative anonymity. Observe that
(11) shows that finite Pareto and stationarity entail a certain form of impatience
(suggested by [van Liedekerke-Lauwers 1997]).
Hence, even if the preorder R satisfies simultaneously fixed step relative
anonymity and stationarity, as it is the case for the generalized time-invariant
5As it is not central to the argument, the problem of existence of a preorder R finite Pareto
and compatible with either fixed step relative anonymity or stationarity, is not adressed here.
However, it can be proved that the generalized time-invariant overtaking is finite Pareto and
compatible with fixed step relative anonymity and a discounted-sum with constant discount-
rate is an example of an order finite Pareto and compatible with stationarity.
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overtaking, this should not be interpreted (if we stick to the interpretation of
incomparability suggested in the introduction) as if the preferences induced by
R were satisfying these two axioms simultaneously.
Now, suppose that R satisfies simultaneously fixed step relative anonymity
and stationarity and that FR,stationarity is seen as more plausible to repre-
sent preferences. This amounts to choose stationarity over fixed step relative
anonymity . We saw that in this case the preferences do not satisfy fixed step rel-
ative anonymity. How then to interpret the fact thatR satisfies fixed step relative
anonymity? Can’t one deduce that the preferences represented by FR,stationarity
recover some virtue from that fact?
Actually, the preferences represented by FR,stationarity satisfy fixed step rel-
ative anonymity only on part of the set of pairs of alternatives (to which (x, y)
does not belong, although (x, y) is in G (FR,stationarity )). One could call that
partial fixed step relative anonymity. Thus, the question may be reformulated
as follows: Does partial fixed step relative anonymity entails, for preferences,
some valuable kind of equity?
Let’s consider a simpler example. Consider the following set of alternatives
E = {(4, 2) ; (2, 4) ; (3, 2) ; (2, 3)}
and the social welfare function defined by f(x) = 3x1 + x2.
f satisfies relative anonymity on the following subset of E ×E:
{[(4, 2) , (3, 2)] ; [(2, 4) , (2, 3)] ; [(2, 3) , (2, 4)] ; [(3, 2) , (4, 2)]}
Although this kind of equity is undoubtedly better than no equity at all, we
cannot however deduce from it that f shows a great sense of equity. Indeed, it
is seen for example that f prefers (3, 2) over (2, 4). Thus, like FR,stationarity , f
displays impatience, although, admittedly, the impatience of f is much sharper
than that of FR,stationarity .
To sum up: The preferences induced by R and stationarity display im-
patience. Assigning to (x, y) the value "is incomparable with" instead of "is
preferred to", whereas the only underlying judgment consistent with R and sta-
tionarity is "x is preferred to y", cannot, I suppose, make preferences more
equitable.
Nevertheless, preferences induced by R and stationarity check fixed step
relative anonymity on some pairs of alternatives. This is valuable insofar as it
can be considered valuable to check an axiom on part of the domain.
8 Concluding remarks
The concept of forced judgment developed in this paper could facilitate the
selection of the desirable preorder. It guarantees a certain intuitive value for the
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judgments if certain axioms consisting of equivalence relations on the Cartesian
product of the set of alternatives by itself, are adopted. This concept proved
useful in showing the proximity between relative anonymity and anonymity.
As future research, it would seem interesting to apply this concept for the
axiom invariance with respect to individual change of origin, asserting the in-
variance of the ranking of two utility streams if one applies the same translation
to both. Indeed, [d’Aspremont-Gevers 2002] give a theorem (theorem 17) which
can be interpreted as stating the existence of forced judgments when alternatives
are "separated" by a given hyperplane. However, there would remain some steps
to be crossed. Indeed, whereas the associated correspondence is πinv(ai+ui) :
Rn ×Rn → P (Rn ×Rn)
(x, y) → {(x0, y0) /∃a in Rn such x0 = x+ a and y0 = y + a}
it remains to determine a set of primary judgments, i.e. a minimal preorder R on
Rn that would generate, joined with πinv(ai+ui), the set of orders characterized
by theorem 17 of [d’Aspremont-Gevers 2002].
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